10. Anti-Intellectualism in Action
10. Anti-intellectualism in action
�������� The two most important consequences of
the anti-intellectual prejudice animating the Sangh are, firstly, an extreme
ineptness at public relations, and secondly, the stunted development of the
Sangh Parivar's own intellectual grip on the world.� An example of the first is the staggering failure of the Hindu
campaign reclaiming Ayodhya to communicate its case to the world, as already
discussed.� The worst part of it is not
that the Sangh people failed to communicate the Hindu case (the biased press
was indeed a formidable obstacle), but that it never took the trouble of
verifying whether its message came across nor of devising ways to deal with the
hostile climate in the media and among India-watchers.
�������� Another example is riot reporting.� Riots, though mostly started by Muslims
(e.g. the Mumbai riots of December 1992 and of January 1993), are
systematically reported in the world media as "pogroms" committed by
well-prepared and well-armed Hindu death squads against poor defenceless
Muslims.� In journalistic and scholarly
references, Advani's peaceful 1990 Rath Yatra has become a proverbially violent
"blood yatra".� Unlike Asghar
Ali Engineer and other riot vultures, the Sangh does not bother to write its
own reports on riots, in spite of its boast that its cadres are
omnipresent.� Quite often, Sangh-related
people tell me interesting and potentially explosive background stories about
riots (and other controversial matters such as discrimination of Hindus,
connivance at Bangladeshi infiltration etc.), but when I ask them for exact
names, times, places, it usually turns out that they have not bothered to
record anything: what would have become a credible-sounding propaganda story in
the hands of A.A. Engineer remains a rumour headed for oblivion in the hands of
Sangh people.�
�������� The lie about "pogroms" is
giving a bad name not only to the organized Hindutva forces, but to Hindu
society as a whole and to India as well; for that reason, the Sangh Parivar has
no right to neglect the public relations job inherent in any socio-political
movement.� Until a decade ago, most
observers and even enemies of Hinduism were prepared to concede to it a certain
harmlessness and benevolent tolerance as quintessentially Hindu qualities;
today, even that little credit has been taken away.� Hindus used to take great pride in Swami Vivekananda's triumphal
speech at the Parliament of Religions in 1893, but the celebration of its 100th
anniversary in Washington DC was just embarrassing because the Ayodhya
demolition was generally considered to have disproven Vivekananda's description
of Hinduism as tolerant.� Hinduism is
now never discussed without mentioning the existence of "Hindu
fundamentalism", at best to disclaim this phenomenon as part of genuine Hinduism,
but more often to prove that Hinduism is just as conducive to fanaticism as
Islam and Christianity are.� The credit
for this additional blot on the fair name of Hinduism must go to the Sangh
Parivar, not because it has taken up Hindu causes like Ayodhya, but because it
has handled them in such a mindless way.
�������� We may compare this with the
performance of the Bosnian Serbs, as contrasted with that of the Bosnian
Muslims.� Without pronouncing an opinion
on the rights and wrongs of the Yugoslav conflict, we may notice a few
pertinent facts about the strengths and weaknesses of the warring parties.� The Serb/Yugoslav army started in a very
comfortable position, and easily established control in up to 73% of the territory;
the Muslim separatist government in Sarajevo found itself defenceless after
hopelessly overplaying its hand by declaring independence, but the Sarajevo
underworld provided the arms and expertise to save at least the capital and
turn it into a base for the reconquest of Bosnia.� From that point onwards, the bragging drunkards on the Serb side
squandered their winning position step by step, while the sobre and determined
Muslims made the most of their limited strength.�
�������� A crucial factor in this war
(admittedly more decisive in a small country than in India) was world
opinion.� The Serbs squandered any
goodwill they might have enjoyed, along with a lot of their ammunition, in
useless and ugly-looking actions against civilians and unimportant targets,
e.g. by bombing the museum city of Dubrovnik in a part of Croatia which they
had no intention to conquer.� The
Muslims, by contrast, fully exploited their underdog position in winning
international sympathy, and also hired the services of two American public-relations
firms.� We all know the results: the
American government willingly violated international agreements and its own
laws by helping Iran in shipping weapons and guerrilla fighters to Bosnia, the
CIA trained Bosnian soldiers, NATO air power destroyed the Serb frontline, the
Bosnian army helped by the Croats reconquered one-third of the Serb-held
territory, and the Dayton agreement formally restored the political unity of
Bosnia, definitively refusing recognition to the Republika Srpska, all
with the approval of remainder-Yugoslavia.�
The Serbs lost the war exclusively by their mindlessness.������
��������
�������� The most serious consequence of the
Sangh's tradition of mindless activism is the second one, the lack of a
developed intellectual perspective on the Indian and world situations.� In their political analysis, Hindutva
activists often use the categor�ies developed by their enemies, and are the
prisoners of these categories.� E.g.,
first they let their enemies lay down the norm of seculari�sm, and then they
try to live up to this norm and prove that they are better secularis�ts than
others (hence BJP "positive secular�ism" vs. Nehruvian
"pseudo-secularism").� This
way, they constantly have to betray their own political identity and try to
fashion themselves a new ("genuinely secular") identity which their
enemies have defined but are not willing to concede to them.� ���������
�������� Sadly, this is common Hindu practice in
the modern age.� Thus, the Christian and
Muslim emphasis on monotheism and condemnation of polytheism has been interio�rized
by Hindu reform movements even as the latter were trying to counter Christian
power in India.� Instead of defending
Hindu polytheism against the missionary vilifica�tion of "idolatry",
the Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj movements claimed that monotheism was indeed
right and polytheism was indeed wrong, but that Hinduism, properly understood,
is more monotheist that Christianity and Islam.� As the historian Shrikant Talageri has remarked, this is as if an
Indian were to say: "The colonial racists were correct in assuming the
superior�ity of white skins over brown skins, but Indians have whiter skins
than Europeans."
�������� Such hopeless exercises in trying to
defeat an opponent after first borrowing his thought categories and value
judgments, are understandable as a result of the inferior position in which
Hindu society has found itself for centuries, always trying to live up to
standards set by their victorious enemies.�
In an inertial hold-over of this psychology, today's Hindutva activists
have an inferiority complex and value nothing so much as being accepted by
respected people, meaning secularists.�
That is why they always offer their platforms to people who despise
them, people like Inder Kumar Gujral and Khushwant Singh (to name two whom I've
seen scheduled as guests of honour at functions of the RSS student organization
Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad), at the same time spurning staunch
Hindus who ought to be their allies but who have been ostracized by the
secularist establishment.�
�������� This approach is, of course, totally
counterproductive, and if the Hindutva strategists had it in them to learn from
the feedback they get from reality, they would have given it up long ago and
opted for a bolder profile.� That this
would be more successful, was briefly illustrated at the height of the Ayodhya
controversy.� Sensing that the public
mood was in favour of the Hindu claim to the disputed temple site, and more
generally of some form of affirmation of India's Hindu identity, the secular�ists
temporarily borrowed the categories from their opponents and started preaching
secularism in the name of Hinduism: "True Hinduism doesn't fuss about
mosques", "Rama himself would not have approved of this quarrel over
his temple", "Swami Vivekanan�da was a secularist too",
etc.� Suddenly, the tables were turned,
Hinduism had become respectable, just because in spite of themselves, the Hindu
leaders had been bold and defiant for once.
�������� But the BJP leadership has definitely
not learned from this experience.�
During the 1996 election campaign, and during the 13-day tenure of the
first-ever BJP Government, A.B. Vajpayee and other BJP leaders were crawling
before the secularist opinion masters and pleading that they were the most
secularist of all.� It recalls the
occasion in 1771 when the Peshwa general Mahadji Sindia, militarily the most
powerful man in India, prostrated before Moghul emperor Shah Alam whom he had
rescued from his Pathan rivals, instead of folding up the decrepit Moghul
empire and declaring Hindu Rashtra.�
The Hindutva forces, instead of seizing power in their own right and
setting up an avowedly Hindu dispensation, keep on crawling before people whom
the Organiser bravely derides as "forces of the past".
�������� I expect Sangh spokesmen to reject this
comparison with the argument that unlike Sindia's, the Vajpayee government's
power position was severely restricted, as it controlled only a minority in the
Lok Sabha.� Fair enough: in the
circumstances, the BJP had to tread carefully, and would have done its duty by
just remaining in power without rocking the boat, if only to break the hysteria
about the "threat of Hindu fundamentalism".� But the point for now is that a review of past experience would
have taught Vajpayee that "more secular than thou" posturing had no
chance at all of making any dent in the secularist hate front against the
BJP.� Hindu society would accept
concessions by a BJP government, on condition that there was a realistic
promise of obtaining certain real gains in return.� Only a fool could have believed that crawling before the
secularists would yield any, but just any reciprocal gesture.� They are, after all, spoiled children, and
the sight of beggars merely makes them laugh.