8. The Sangh�s Anti-Intellectualism
8. The Sangh's anti-intellectualism
�������� A very serious flaw which Gandhians and the Sangh have in common is their anti-intellectualism.� Though Gandhi reputedly rebuked RSS founder K.B. Hedgewar for not publishing any doctrinal statements, i.e. for not giving any intellectual articulation to his nationalist movement, he essentially shared Hedgewar's aversion for an intellectual job well done.� Both of them made people march many miles, both led their followers to make great sacrifices, and both failed to substantially raise their followers' political understanding.� They did not bother to educate them (and themselves) in analyzing the character of the different forces in the field, all on the plea that "an ounce of practice is worth more than a ton of theory".
�������� Instead of developing an analysis and
tracing the Hindu-Muslim conflict to its (Quranic) roots, they chose to work on
people's emotions.� Gandhi practised
emotional intimidation on the Hindus with his ascetic gimmicks, but failed
completely before the doctrinal wall of rejection which Islam had erected
against his "Hindu-Muslim unity".�
Gandhi's pleas for this interreligious unity were like the attempt at
air travel by a premodern person: without studying the laws of physics and
applying them through the appropriate technology, all he could achieve was to
jump from a tower and fall to his death.�
Calling for the tearing-down of the wall of hatred between Muslims and
non-Muslims without properly understanding its causes was an anti-rational
endeavour doomed to bitter failure; Gandhi merely banged his own head against
the wall until his skull broke.�����
�������� Gandhi's anti-intellectualism was
evident in other fields too.� He refused
to make a proper study of the history and doctrines of his own religion, replacing
its complexity and richness with the monolatry of a single booklet, the
Bhagavad-Gita, which he also refused to study properly, subjecting it to a
dogmatic sentimental interpretation instead.�
Thus, Gandhi's reading of the Gita (heavily influenced by the
"Sermon on the Mount" aspect of Christianity) included the untenable
claim that the Gita teaches absolute non-violence.� In reality, one of the Gita's main themes is refuting the
typically Gandhian anti-confrontationist arguments given by Arjuna in the first
chapter.
�������� Admittedly, Gandhi was not the first to
twist Hindu scripture to suit his own pet theories, e.g. Shankara, Ramanuja and
Madhva managed to identify each his own version of Vedanta philosophy as the
"true" meaning of the Upanishads.�
But these acharyas applied their intellect and erudition to make their
point, while Gandhi haughtily rejected the importance of intellectual skills in
discerning the true meaning of a text, claiming that moral character was the
decisive factor in correctly understanding scripture.� He was wrong: people of bad character may understand scripture
quite well (an example from Hindu tradition is Ravana, a well-educated
scoundrel), while people of good character may not understand it at all (e.g.
all those good people who are outside the civilizational ambit of a given
scriptural tradition).
�������� The result of Gandhi's
anti-intellectualism was that he conducted his politics like a sleep-walker:
wilfully blind to the character of the forces he was dealing with.� And since people, even very ordinary people,
cannot be satisfied for long with a diet of exalted emotions and
counter-commonsensical activism, his refusal to address the doctrinal aspect of
certain political problems (the Muslim challenge, the paradoxical situation
created in Indian politics by World War 2, the rising lure of Marxism) made
people look for an ideological framework elsewhere.� Gandhi's focus on emotions was good for spectacular scenes of
millions marching, but it failed to achieve the political goals which these
millions thought they were serving.� The
independence of a united India never came, nor was truncated India in any sense
a Ram Rajya or a realization of any ideal Gandhi ever stood for.
�������� The Communists, by contrast, worked on
people's minds.� They gave them (not
just their card-carrying foot soldiers but nearly the whole opinion-making and
decision-making classes) a framework with which to analyze political events and
cultural trends.� It is quite clear
which approach was more fruitful: soon after Marxism appeared on the Calcutta
scene, it eclipsed the Hindu Renaissance (when Sri Aurobindo retired from
public life, people like Hedgewar failed to take over his torch), and by the
time Gandhi died, Gandhism as a genuine political movement had been blown away
by Marxism.� For several decades after
Independence, non-Communist politicians implemented Communist policies, because
they were mentally trapped in Marxist schemes of analysis; by contrast, even
nominally Gandhian politicians betrayed everything Gandhi ever stood for
(except Muslim appeasement, which Indian Marxists also promoted).� In the long run, emotions are
inconsequential, and the Communists prospered and could make others implement
their own policies just by promoting their own thought.
� ������ Like
Gandhi, the RSS and BJP cloak many of their campaigns and political demands in
terms of emotions, and this approach proves as futile as in Gandhi's case.� Thus, a complaint about the lack of national
consciousness in the school curriculum is titled: "The education system
does not promote natio�nal sentiments".�
Patriotic feelings develop naturally on the basis of a genuinely felt
common destiny, but in the case of many Muslims, this natural process is
thwarted by the Islamic ideas in which they are indoctrinated.� So, the only way to "promote national
sentiments" is a job of intellectual persuasion: remove this doctrinal
hurdle by helping Muslims to discover that the basic doctrine of Islam is mistaken.� If you are too lazy to study Islam and find
out what is wrong with it, all your efforts to "promote national
sentiments" among youngsters brought up on a diet of anti-Hindu teachings
will prove futile.�
�������� The BJP's statements on Ayodhya are
full of calls to "respect people's sen�timents" (the title of the BJP
brochure containing L.K. Advani's historic Lok Sabha speech on Ayodhya dd. 7
August 1989).� In
general, sentiments should be respected, but not absolutely.� Sometimes, hurting sentiments is the
inevitable and relatively unimportant consequence of a rightful and necessary
act, e.g. there is no doubt that imperialist Muslims felt hurt in their
sentiments when the BJP supported Hindu society's claim to Ayodhya, ignoring
the Muslim community's cherished God-given right to occupy other religions'
sacred places.� At any rate, sentiments
cannot be the basis of a judicially enforceable claim: thieves also develop a
sentimental attachment to some of their stolen goods, yet that doesn't give
them a right to these goods.� The
Ayatollahs may have been genuinely hurt in their sentiments by The Satanic
Verses, but that gave them no right to kill its author or even to ban the
book.� Even people who feel no
sentimental attachment to the Rama Janmabhoomi site, such as myself, can find
that the site rightfully belongs to Hindu society alone, on impeccably
objective and unsentimental grounds.�
The appeal to sentiment is normally but the last resort of people who
have failed in defending their case on more serious juridical and historical
grounds.
�������� Gandhi's experiences should have taught
the Sangh that emotionalism is powerless.�
So should its own failures with this approach.� For seventy years the RSS has been busy inculcating "patriotic
feelings", and this has not made an iota of difference in preventing the
rise of separatism in Panjab, Kashmir and the northeast.� The result of this approach in the Ayodhya
dispute should serve as an eye-opener: the appeal to sentiment failed to win a
single skeptic or secularist or Muslim over to the Hindu position.� Spreading knowledge is a far more powerful
way of influencing public opinion than these impotent attempts to promote
certain emotions.� Yet the Sangh Parivar
has not adapted its strategy, it simply repeats a strategy which is a proven
failure.� That brings us to another
typically Gandhian flaw in the Sangh: its stubborn refusal to learn from
feedback.�
�������� A defining characteristic of all life
forms is that, to a greater or lesser extent, they act upon feedback: they
adapt their behaviour in reaction to its observed effect.� If you put your hand in boiling water, you
feel pain and immediately pull your hand back; by contrast, a stone falling
into this boiling water does not show the least inclination to pull back.� Higher life forms even develop feed-forward
mechanisms: rather than first undergoing the effects of a certain behaviour
before adapting it, they are capable of foreseeing its effect and of either
aborting or pursuing the intended behaviour depending on the expected
effect.� Once you know enough about
boiling water, you can foresee the effect of putting your hand into it, and
adapt your behaviour accordingly so as to handle boiling water without letting
it touch your skin.� But dead entities
do not have these capacities of adapting to feed-back or feed-forward information.� A glass falling from the table does not
foresee the effect and does not try to avoid it; even after having fallen to
pieces and being glued together again, it will still not do anything to avoid
falling next time.� Dead entities don't
learn.
�������� Going by this criterion, both Gandhi
and the Sangh have always been quite dead.�
In the Khilafat movement, Gandhi bent over backwards to please the
Muslim leadership, he gave them a blank cheque, yet they didn't show any
gratitude or sympathy, but rather intensified their anti-national commitments
and their political separatism.� His
attempt to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity by means of all-out appeasement was a
dismal failure.� Yet, he kept on
repeating the same approach for twenty-five years, and even after this had
yielded Partition, he still kept on repeating it.� There is no indication that he ever did any introspection to
correct this disastrous policy on the basis of the feedback which he was
receiving from reality.� Once he had
embarked on this course, he simply continued in the same orbit like any dead
object in space subject to the law of inertia.
�������� Similarly, the Sangh is not learning
from its experiences.� For example, to
reassure its bonafide critics (e.g. foreign journalists who are not part of the
secularist coterie but have interiorized its misinformation for lack of
anything better) about the bogey of "Hindu fundamentalism", RSS and
BJP spokesmen always plead that "a Hindu state cannot be anti-secular, it
is a contradiction in terms" or that "Hinduism and theocracy cannot
co-exist".� They
have been saying this for decades and keep on repeating it quite placidly, but
to my knowledge, they have never ever checked whether the message actually came
across.�
�������� As labels go, it would not be unfair to
describe the Arya Samaj as "Veda fundamentalists", or Swami Karpatri
and the Puri Shankaracharya as "Manuwadi fundamentalists", so
India-watchers may have a point when they do conceive of the notion of
"Hindu fundamentalism".� The
RSS is certainly not a fundamentalist movement, is definitely not
working for a Scripture-based law system, but the simplistic argumentation
usually given, viz. that its being Hindu by itself excludes the possibility of
fundamentalism, is just not the right one.�
At any rate, nobody seems ever to have changed his mind under the
influence of this plea.� The worst part
of it is not that it fails to convince anyone, but that the Hindutva spokesmen
have never even bothered to register this fact, much less to draw any practical
conclusions from it.