1. Visions of a Demographic Doomsday
1. Visions of a demographic
doomsday
1.1.
Hindus, the dying race
������ Demograp�hy can change the cultural orien�tation
of a country or region by making an original�ly small group numeri�cally domina�nt.� Thus, demographic success was a decisive
factor in the Chris�tian take-over of the Roman Em�pir�e: in the first three
cen�turies,� Christian numbers grew by 40% per year, due to conver�sion and to
the rejec�tion of birth control (whether primitive contr�acep�tion, abortion or
in�fantici�de).��� Demographic shifts can lead
to violen�ce: in Leban����������������������on, the tilt of the demog�raphic
balance in favour of the Muslims, leading to demands of a redistribut�ion of
political power shared with the Chris�tians, was one of the causes of the civil
war.� Hindus ought to know, for they
themselves have also done it once: "After years of im�migra�tion by ethnic
Nepa�lis, [Sikkim] lost its sovereig�nty when a Nepali majority chose to be
part of India."� Finally, a certain demography
can lead to self-an�nihil�ation: many mem�bers of India's Parsi com�munity have
resig�ned to the perspective that their community will soon disap�pear due to a
suicidal demographic self-forget�ful�n�ess.�� ����
������ In today's India, demography is a hot
item, not just because of the economic and ecological burden of overpopulation,
but even more because of the differential between Hindus and Muslims with its
real or perceived political implicati�ons.�
One of the classic statements of this concern is Hindu Sangathan,
Saviour of the Dying Race (Delhi 1926), in which Swami Shrad�dhan�anda
briefly sketches the problem of demographic decl�ine thre�atening Hindu
survival: "while Muhammadans multiply like anything, the numbers of the
Hindus are dwindling periodical�l�y".����
1.2.
Ominous census figures
������ Swami Shraddhananda quotes from the 1911
Census Report (para 172 ff.) to show the reasons why the Muslim populat�ion is
growing faster than the Hindu population, whose per�cent�age of the total
population is steadily declinin�g.� The
Census Direc�tor had writ�ten: "The number of Muham�mada�ns has risen
during the decade [1901-11] by 6.7 per cent as compared with only 5 p.c. in the
case of Hindus.� There is a small but continuous
accession of converts from Hinduism and other religions, but the main reason
for the relatively more rapid growth of the followers of the Prop�het is that
they are more prolific."� Follow a num�ber of social� cus�toms which en�courage the Muslim birth
rate, e.g. fewer marriage rest�rictions and common remar�riage of wi�dows, and
the Muslim insistence that the children of mixed marriages be brought up as
Muslims.
������ In 1909, on the basis of demographic
trends visible in the census results (1881, 1891, 1901), Colonel U.N. Mukherji
had projec�ted the rate of Hindu decline into the future in a stric�tly linear
fashion, and cal�cula�ted logically (if somewhat simplistically) that it would
take less than 420 years for the Hindu race to disappear complet�ely from the
face of In�dia.� This was a
"correction" on 1891 Census Commis�sioner O'Donnell's prediction that
the Hindus would die out in 620 years.�
The series of articles in the Ben�galee of 1909 in which Mukherji
propo�sed his analysis was titled: "Hi�ndus, a Dying Ra�ce".�
������ This pessimistic prognosis of the
numerical Hindu-Muslim propor�tion defi�nes the problem to which Swami Shrad�dhanan�da
(who knew Mukherji personally) tried to offer a soluti�on.� One of Mukher�ji's conclud�ing sen�tences,
"They count their gains, we calculate our losses", became the title
of a Hindu Mahasabha pamphlet as late as 1979.� If anything, the fever of Hindu
demographic pessimism is only rising.
1.3.
"Hindus talking nonsense"
������ The Hindu suspicion that Islam is using
demography to increase its strength and to wrest territories from Hinduism is a
constant theme in Hindu Revivalist writing from at least 1909 till today.� The rhetoric is often shrill and exag�gerated
and the case is wrapped in the wrong ar�guments, most notably the claim that
"M�uslims have lots of children because they have four wive�s".� A typical examp�le, refer�ring to the of�ficial
birth-cont�rol slogan, "we are two, our [children] are two",
is the following: "For the Hindu the slogan is: We are two, and we have
two.� The slogan for a Moslem is: We
are five and we have twen�tyfiv�e."� Sometim��es,� out�side
authorities (the BBC, the WHO) are falsely claimed as confir�ming the Hindus'
worst fears: "The United Nati�ons census projec�tions have in�dicated that
the un�contr�olled birthrate of the Mos�lems of India coupled with huge
infiltrations will turn India into a Moslem major�ity coun�try before the year
2000 AD."
������ It is, therefore, no surprise that The
Econo�mist ridicules these demogra�phic doomsday scenarios: "Hi�ndu
militan�ts are talking� nonsense by predicting that chunks of the country will
gain Muslim majorit�ies and then secede�".� There is no doubt that some of
the rheto�������ric generat�e�d by this Hindu unrest about the future is plain
nonsense, but it doesn't follow that the propor�tional decline of the Hindus is
mere fantasy.� The Econo�mist
itself ack�nowledges the numerical gains of the Indian Mus�lim community, and
explains that Mus�lims are less willing to use birth con�tr�ol, and that the
infant mor�tality rate is lower among Muslims because they are more con�centr�ated
in the cities where medical care is better. �����
������ For those who dismiss U.N. Mukherjee's
reasoning as an obvious and ridicu�lous case of paranoia, it may be useful to
verify this prediction for the subsequent 80 years.� Of�ficial census data show that the Hindu per�centage has decli�ned,
and the Muslim percentage increas�ed, in every single successive census in
British India, free India, Pakistan and Bangl�adesh.� As we are about to demonstrate in some detail, the demo�g�raphic
trends con�firm Mukher�ji's general predic�tion of a steady decline, though a
quan�titative prognosis is more complex than he en�visaged.
1.4.
Demography: the facts
������ Considering the pivotal role of the Hindu
Reviva�list per�ception that Hinduism is besieged and that demog�raphy is one
of the weap�ons used by Islam against Hin�duism, I believe that a meaningful
dis�cussion of Hindut�va ideology is only possible after verif�icat�ion of this
fundamental per�ception.� Indeed, on
this verifica�tion depends whether we ought to con�sider the Hindutva movem�ent
as a bunch of dangerous lunatics spreading lies and paran�oia (a fairly common
assumption among India-watche�rs) or merely a group of realistic people who try
to face up to real challenges.
������ The following table shows the percentage
of Hindus and Muslims in British India in every successive census since 1881:
������
������ yr. 1881�� 1891�� 1901�� 1911��
1921�� 1931�� 1941
������ H.�
75.09� 74.24� 72.87�
71.68� 70.73� 70.67�
69.46
� ���� M.� 19.97�
20.41� 21.88� 22.39�
23.23� 23.49� 24.28�
������ And these are the figures for the Indian
Republic:���
������ year�� 1951��� 1961���
1971��� 1981�� 1991 est.
������ H.� 84.98�� 83.51�� 82.72�� 82.29��
81.8
������ M.����
9.91�� 10.70�� 11.21��
11.73�� 12.2
������ These official figures are not altogether
ac�curate for 1981 and 1991, for Assam was not counted in 1981 and neither was
the state of Jammu & Kashmir in 1991.�
Ad�justed on the basis of an estimate for these states, the figures for
1991 become: Hindus 81.54%, Muslims 12.60�%.���� The figure of 12.60% for
Muslims in 1991 is confirmed by in�depen�dent secularist observers on the basis
of official data and standard procedures for extrapolati�on. � I will use that figure in preference to the Govern�ment��
figure.� This brings the Hindu
percentage down to ca. 81.5%.
������ In trun�cated India, the Muslim
population has grown 2.69% in forty years (from 9.91% to 12.6% in 1951-91), but
Muslim leaders like Imam Bukhari routine�ly claim that the true figure of the
Muslim popul�ation in the Indian Repub�lic is about 3% high�er.� There are indeed some probl�ems
with the official figur��es�� for the Indi�an Republic, e.g. there is a suspic�ion
that many illegal Bangladeshi immigrants are lying low and avoid�ing the census
personnel because they are used to a regime which is not so leni�ent with un�sol�ici�ted
im�migrants (Banglad�esh pushed back the Muslim Rohin�gya refug�ees from
Myanmar in 1992-93).� But for the
present� dis�cus�sion, it is probably best to keep these al�leged un�registered
mil�lions outside our considerations and stick to verified figures.� Even without this unknown "dark
figure" of unregistered Muslim inhabitants, it is only very slightly exag�gerated
to say that in the Indian Repub�lic, ever since 1951, "the propor�tion of
Mus�lims has been gradually but steadily increa�sing every decade by roughly
one percentage point"�.
������ All kinds of local and regional data
confirm the faster muslim grow�th rate.�
The two provinces with the highest relative population growth bet�ween
1981 and 1991 are Kashmir (28%) and Lakshadweep (27%), both with a Muslim
minority though in very divergent economic and political conditions; fol�lowed
by Madhya Pradesh (26%) and Uttar Pradesh (25%).� In Uttar Prade�sh, between 1981
and 1991, the Muslim percentage rose from 15.53% to 17.33 %, in Bihar from
14.13% to 14.81%, in West Bengal from 21.51 to 23.61%.� While in Bihar birth control seemed to have
a slight effect in a decrease of the decadal increase from 30.03% in 1971-81 to
29.5% (still more than 5% higher than the Hindu figure) in 1981-91, there was a
much larger increase in the decadal increase in U.P. from 29.11% to 36.54%, and
in West Bengal from 29.55% to 36.89%.
1.5.
Extrapolation
������ How does all this work out for U.N.
Mukherji's demogra�phic doomsday pro�gnosis?�
Mani Shankar Aiyar, the Congress Party's leading anti-Hin�dutva polemic�ist,
predi�cted in 1993 that until at least the mid-21st cen�tury, the proportion of
Muslims will remain stable "bar a decimal point up or down from time to
time, at 11.2 per cent."� But even the conse�r�vative
estimate for 1991 (not yet pub�lis�hed at the time of his writing) already refu�ted
his prediction by putting the Muslim popula�tion more than 1% high�er.� In the contest between Mukherji's prediction
of a con�tinuous Mus�lim growth and Aiyar's prediction of a stable percentage
for the next sixty years, Mukherji has obviously won.��
������ Other secu�lar�ist observers admit that
"it is true that the growth rate amon�gst Muslims is higher than amon�gst
Hin�dus", and have cal�culat�ed, on the basis of the 1971 and 1981 census
figures, that "if both the com�munities con�tinue to grow at the same
rate, Mus�lims at the turn of the cen�tury will account for only 13.55% of the
count�ry's populat�ion."� That constitut�es��� a refut�ation
of the still-recent rumour that Muslims will out�number Hindus by the year
2,000, but also an admission that the Muslim percentage shows a continuous
substantial increase.� For the long
term, their estimate is: "It will take 316 years for Mus�lims to outnumber
Hin�dus".���� Here, the dif�ference with
Mukherji is merely one over the exact quan�tity of time needed to do the job.
������ The projection just quoted is a strictly
linear extrap�olation of the Hindu-Mus�lim differential in the decade
1971-1981.� But this approach fails to
take into ac�count at least two impor�tant� factors which we will now consider
more closely: the Muslim incre�ase is not linear, but is itself increa�sing;
and there is a large im�migrati�on of Muslims from Pakistan and Banglad�esh,
which can only incre�ase.
1.6.
The long-term trend
������ Ever since regular census operations were
started, the per�centage of Muslims has grown every decade in British India, in�dependent
India, Pakis�tan and Banglade�sh.� The
only seeming excep�tion is Pakistan bet�ween 1971 and 1981, due to the
official d�eclara�tion of Ah�madiyas (ca. 3%) as non‑Muslims in
1974.� We will include the Ahmadiyas in
the Muslim category, as they themselves also do.
������ In the subcon�tinent, Muslims were 19.97%
in 1881 and 24.28% in 1941 when the last pre-Partition census was held.� According to the last census (1991), the
Muslim percentage in the subcontinent was as follows:
������
������ Bangla Desh: 86.8% of 108,760,000, or ca.
94,40�3,608.���
������ Pakistan: 97.0% of 126,406,000, or ca.
122,61�3,820.�
������ India: 12.6 % of 846,349��,050, or ca.
106,639,�980�.��
������ Total: ���29.92% of 1,081,�515,0�50, or
ca. 323,657,480.�
������ The Muslim percentage has not only incre�ased,
but the rate of increase itself has increased.�
This is very clear when we take a long-term perspective: in the fifty
years between 1941 and 1991, their per�cent�age has risen 5.64% (from 24.28% to
29.92%), substan�tially more than the 4.31% gain in the sixty years bet�ween
1881 and 1941.� At this rate, the
Muslims in the Subcon�tinent must have passed the 30% mark in the mid-1990s and
will pass the miles�tone of becoming more than half the num�ber of Hindus (ca.
32% to ca. 64%) before the census of 2011.�
������ Simi�larly calculating from the available
figures for the three coun�tr�ies, the Hindu per�centage had come down to
65.15% in 1991.� To evaluate the trend of the
Hindu percentage, we must take into account that the pre-Indepen�dence census
always had a tentative category "trib�al" or "animist",
variously defined and therefore making odd quantitative jumps (but always
between 2.26% and 3.26%), from 2.57% in 1881 to 2.26% in 1941.� After Indepen�dence, this
category was included in the Hindu categ�ory.�
So, putting everything on the post-In�dependence deno�mi�nator, we
include the "animists" in the Hindu percentage to get a total Hindu
percentage of 77.35% for 1881, 71.72% for 1941, and 65.15% for 1991.� Here again, we see a long-term ac�celerat�ion
of the ob�served trend: a decrease of 5.63% in the sixty years between 1881 and
1941, and a larger decre�ase of 6.57% in the shorter period of fifty years bet�ween
1941 and 1991.
������ So, all the predictions quoted above are
far too conservative, for they are based on a linear projection.� In reality, the observed trends are
accelerating, so Mus�lims will need far less than 316 years to out�number the
Hindus.� According to Muk�herji, the
Hindu percentage of ex-British India (including India, Pakistan, Banglad�esh
and Burma) should now have declined by about 13%, down to 54% of the
total.� This was too pessimistic, he
overestimated the rate of Hindu decline, but in the future the increasing rate
of Hindu decline will catch up with Mukherji's estimate.
1.6.
Muslim testimony
������ A very unexpected prediction which more
than con�firms this trend is implicitly given by one of those auth�ors who
ridic�ule Hindu fears about the demographic evoluti�on: Rafiq Zakaria claims
that to outnumber Hin�dus, "Mu�slims will need no less than 365
years", but in another dis�cus�sion in the same book he complains that
according to an all-India govern�men�tal survey in 1984, Muslim children were
under�represen�ted among primary school pupils: "the enrolment of Muslim
children at the primary school level in the relevant period was 12.39 per cent
as agai�nst the child population of 16.81 per cent."� So, Rafiq Zakaria claims that
in 1984, Muslim child�r�en in the prim�ary-school age group constitu�ted 16.81%
of the total.�
������ This means that ap�proximately by the
time this group reac�hes the median position on the age pyramid of their
community (i.e. when the number of people younger than them will equal the
number older than them), certainly before 2010 (when they will be in their
mid-thirties), the native Muslim popul�ation of India, not counting the
millions of post-1984 immigrants, will be 16.81% of the total.� That is even faster than all the above
(admitte�dly cautious) cal�culati�ons suggest, as if the religi�ous
differential in the use of birth control since the 1960s is having a bigger
impact than hitherto assumed.�
������ It gets even more dramatic when you look
at it this way: in 1984, a generat�ion of Muslims which was about 12% of the
population had produ�ced a generation of children, certainly not more than 30
years younger on average, which constitu�ted more than 16%.� This would mean an unpreceden�ted growth
rate of more than 4% in less than 30 years, or rather, a growth with over a
third of the original per�centage (4 to 12).�
For a little thought experiment: if this differential growth rate is
kept con�stant, we get 16.81% of Muslims in ca. 2014, over 22% in 2044, near�ly
30% in 2074, 40% in 2104, crossing 50% in ca. 2125 etc., all with�out coun�ting
the effect of Muslim immigration.
������ Of course, demographic prediction is a
difficult task, which has to factor in many different types of data and
influences, so we should not take any amateur predic�tions too seriously, nor
those of specialists paid by political institutions with an interest in
popularizing this or that impression about demographic trends.� Let us not pin ourselves down on precise
predictions but let us not ignore the generally visible trend either.� The one general prediction to which the data
cer�tainly compel us, is that the Muslim percentage will be increas�ing at an
ac�celerating rate for at least another generation; and also beyond that,
unless the present generation of young adult Muslims brings it procreati�on
rate down to the average Indian level.