3. The Muslim Birth rate
3.1.
Muslim fertility
������ Is
there anything demonstrably intentional about this Islamic demo�gra�phic
expansion?� In an article seek�ing to
"explode the myth" of Mus�lim demo�gra�phic aggres�sion, jour�nali�sts
Namita Bhan�dare, Louise Fernan�des and Minu Jain them�selves admit that accor�ding
to of�ficial surveys, "the disapproval of family planning is highest among
Muslims", while "the practice of family planning methods in 1980 was
lowest amongst Muslims (only 23% of those surveyed prac�tised it as op�posed to
36% Hin�d�us)".�� They furt����������h��������������������������������er
admit that between 1971 and 1981, "the Hindu po�pu�l�ation was up by 24.1�5%,
whereas the Muslim popula�tion shot up by 30.59�%".� Further, they give the decline in fer�tility
levels in the same period: 20.1% decline for urban and 20.0% for rural Hindus,
18.5% for urban and 17.3% for rural Mus�lims.�
This means that the al�ready lower fertility level of the Hindus is
declining faster than that of the Muslims.
������ Let us hear the same indications from an
official source: "The total fertility�
rate (TFR) is 3.4 children per woman. (...) Muslims have con�siderably
higher fer�tility than any other religious group.� Muslim women have a TFR of 4.4, which is 1.1 children higher than
the TFR for Hindu women."
������ The implication of these data is that the
Muslim rate of growth in percentage of the Indian population will go on incre�asing.� Instead of extrapolating across cen�turies,
we may make a safer prognosis for the next few decades.� It is safe to pred�ict that the 2001 census
will show another sharp increase in the rate at which Muslims are demograph�ically
catching up with the Hindu majority.� It
is then that the full effect of the birth control cam�paigns of the 1960s and
70s will become visible.� Given the
higher Hindu participation in the birth control effort of the 1960s and 70s, we
must now be witnes�sing a cumulative effect, of a proportionately smaller
number of Hindu moth�ers (born in that period) having in their turn each a
smaller number of children than the propor�tiona�tely larger number of Muslim
mothers, on average.��
3.2.
The economic explanation
������ Unable to refute the Hindu Revivalist
perception of a visible and increasing Muslim demographic growth, the
journalists retreat to their next line of defence: they admit the fact of
Muslim demographic expan�sion but discon�nect it from Muslim identi�ty.� They offer as their expla�nation that it has
nothing to do with Islam as such nor with any ag�gressive designs: it is all
due to Muslim poverty, "the reason has to do with econom�ics and not with
religi�on".�� This is the old Marxist
clich�: red�u�ce everyt�hing������ to econo�mic fac�tors.� It is still the most common explan�at�ion
for the higher Muslim growth rate: the average Indian Muslim is poorer and less
educa�ted than the average Hindu, and pover�ty and low educat�ion both happen
to lead to a higher birth rate.
������ Baljit Rai, a retired police officer who
was a personal witness to India's failure in con�tain�ing the rising tide of il�legal
im�migration from Bangladesh, refu�tes this ar�gument by poin�ting to the birth
rate among Kerala Muslims, who have a high level of education and a relativ�ely
high stan�dard of living.� Mani Shankar
Aiyar had clai�med on the basis of statewise figures for the south�ern states
that "Muslim birth rates in all these en�light�ened states are very much
lower than Hindu birth rates in unen�lightened states like Uttar Prad�esh".��� However, Rai's clos��er��
analy�s�is of the figur��������������es� shows that the Kerala Mus�lims have a
higher birth-rate than the natio�nal Hindu average and even than the Hindu
average in poor and back�ward states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan:
the population growth (+28.74% for 1981-91) in the Muslim-majority district of
Malappuram (with female liter�acy at 75.22%, far higher than among Hindus in
the Hindi belt) is more than twice as high as the aver�age for Kerala (+13.98),
and well above the Hindu national aver�age (+23.50).
������ A secularist journalist confirms:
"In spite of this 'near total literac�y' the popula�tion growth rate of
Muslims who constitute one-fourth of Kerala's population is as high as 2.3 per
cent per year, which is more than even the natio�nal PGR [= population growth
rate] of 2.11 per annum and is almost double the PGR of Hindus in Kerala it�se�lf."����
������ The figures for Kerala exemplify a
general rule: at any given level of literacy and economic status, Muslims will
have a marked�ly higher birth rate than their Hindu counterparts, even to the
extent of having a higher birth rate than Hindus in a lower educa�tional or
income brack�et.� A secularist
journalist, Pranay Gupta, estimates that in Hyderabad, which has a large Muslim
middle-class, a typical Muslim family has eight child�ren while a Hindu family
has four.�
3.3.
The literacy factor
������ Ever since the prop�agation of birth
contro�����������������l among the Hindu mas�ses, rich and literate Muslims
have more child�ren than poor and illiterate Hindus -- the religi�ous deter�minant
overrules the econo�mic determinant.�
This comes out clearly when we compare with the admittedly high growth
rate for the Scheduled Castes: "The high growth rate of Muslims, due to
poverty, illiteracy etc., is comparable to the growth rate of Scheduled
Castes", writes Ashish Bose; but he himself gives the SC growth rate as
31% for the decade 1981-91 agai�nst the Muslim growth rate of 32.8%�. �� True, some Muslims
fall in the same low-income catego�ry�� as the SCs; but taking into account the
Muslim middle-class, some old landed gentry and a lot of guest wor�kers in the
Gulf states, the average Muslim income is con�siderably higher than the average
SC income.�
������ Likewise, illiteracy is definite�������ly
higher among the SCs than among Muslims.�
And yet, the Muslim growth rate is still 1.8% higher than that of the
SCs.� "Even after contr�olling for
the level of education among women, relig�ious differentials in fer�tility per�sist.� Scheduled Caste women have a higher TFR
(3.9) than Scheduled Tribe women (3.6) and non-SC/ST women (�3.3)"�� -- all of them considerably less than the Muslim TFR of 4.4.�
������ The same is true for the rural-urban dif�feren�tial:
just like in other countries, Indian rural coup�les have a higher fer�tility
(5.7 for Hindus, 6.2 for Muslims) than urban couples (4.2 for Hindus, 4.9 for
Mus�lims), but this secular determinant of fer�tility is over�ruled by the
relig�ious deter�mina�nt, for Muslims are more con�centr�ated in the cities but
have a higher over-all birth rate nonethe�less.
������ Incidentally, the source just cited,
Mohan Rao, provi�des an example of the misplaced confidence with which
secularists berate Hindu Revival�ists as unreliable, men�dacious etc.� Though riding a very high horse in his denun�ciat�ion
of "communal propaga�nda", Rao himself makes a conspic�uously counter�factual
state�ment: "The Hindu populat�ion increased by 0.71 per cent bet�ween
1961-71 and 1971-81.� The populat�ion of
Muslims rose by 0.05 per cent, much less than that of Hindus. (...) the growth
rates of Hindus will continue to be higher than those of Mus�lims."�
������ He confuses the figures for the incre�ase
in popu�lat�ion with the actual popula�tion figures.� The Hindu growth rate increa�sed bet�ween 1971 and 1981, from
23.71% to 24.42% (a finding on which Mani Shankar Aiyar builds a simila�rly mis�taken
case against a furt�her Hindu decrease and Muslim increase), but remained�� far below the Muslim growth rate of 30.85% c.q. 30.90%,
so that the effec�tive Hindu percentage decreased (by O.37%).� Moreov�er, this incre�ase was a freak
develop�ment in a long-term decrease of the Hindu growth rate due to family
plan�ning, and was easily undone by a decre�ase twice as big (to 22.78%) in
1991.���
3.4.
The Muslim growth rate worldwide
������ The same trend as witnessed in India is
conspicu���ous at the inter�national level: Muslim count�ries are among the
cham�pions of demog�raphic growth.� The
econo�mic expla��nat�ion for high and low birthr�ates breaks down when confron�ted
with the figures for Muslim countries: the rich and or�thodox Saudi Arabs
procreate much faster than the relati�vely poor but more secularized
Turks.�
������ The yearbooks of the En�cyclopedia
Brittannica give a wealth of countr�ywise data, inc�lud�ing the
population's doubling‑r�ate, which is a more accurate indicator of effec�tive
demographic growth than the birth rate.�
It turns out that no Muslim coun�try �has a marked�ly lower growth rate
than India.� Indonesia, Turkey and
Tunisia are at about the same level as India, which is already seen by many as
a demogra�phic disaster area itself (do�ubl�ing in ca. 33 years).� It is no coincidence that these are the
three most secul�arized Muslim countri�es.� The more Is�lamic a country,
the high���������er�� the birthr�ate: Iran, Jordan, Lybia, Kuwait and Eritrea
double their populati�ons in 20 years or less, up to twice as fast as In�d�ia.����
������ The Arabs are the champions: "In no
Arab country���� does the popul�ation increase at a rate lower than 2.5% per
year.� In practically every Arab
country, more than 4 inhabitants in 10 are youngsters below 15."� Pakis�tan is Asia's� fastest�-growing
non-Arab count���ry,� doubling its popu�lat�ion every 24 yea�rs.�� No country is known to have a
higher birth‑r�ate among non‑Mus�lims than among Muslims, but count�ries
where the opposite is true are numerous.� The starkest differential is
proba��b����������ly������ found in the Europ�ean count�ries.� Thus, to use anot�her demo�gra�phic in�dicat�or,
the per�cent�age of the under-25 age group in Brit�ain is 33 for natives, 48
for In�dians (mostly Hindus) and Carib�beans, 60 for Pakistanis and 63 for
Bangl�ade�s�his.� A similar indicator for the
Subcontinent: the under-15 constitute 46.3% in Pakis�tan, 45.1% in Bangladesh,
and 35.2% in India.�
������ ��In Bel�gium, the aver��age native
couple (Chri�stian or secular) has 1.7 child�ren, the immi�grant Moroccan
couple (Mu�slim) has 3.25 chi�ldr�en, i.e. nearly twice as many.� About American Islam, a Pakis����������������������tani
observer makes an estimate for the year 2,000: "The US (...) may by then
become the 14th or 15th 'larg�est Islamic country�'.� Islam, in fact, is the fastest-growing religion in the
US".� Though the growth is largely
due to im�migration, he also sees "a higher birth rate" as "a
major fac�t�o�r".����
3.5.
Islamic government policies
������ In Malaysia, where Muslims were only 50%
at the time of in�depen�dence, just enough to declare it an Is�lamic state, the
Gover�nment pur�sues a natalist policy at least as far as the Muslim Malays are
con�cern�ed (non-Muslims are mostly members of the Chin�ese and Tamil Hindu
mino�ritie�s).� It is only in countries
where Muslims are in an overwh�elming major�ity and demographic competition is
simply not an issue that Islamic governments and religious lead�ers, faced with
the probl�ems resul�ting from overpopulation, have made an effort to curb the
birth rate.�
������ Iran now tries to en�cour�age a
three-children-per-family norm, and prides itself on reduc�ing the yearly
increase in popula�tion to 1.75%, about half of what it was in the 1980s.� But this will not markedly curb
popula������������������������������������tion growth in absolute figures for
the next few decades: "A�lth�ough the rate of population� growth� has come
down (...) the girls born in response to Khomein�i's call for more Muslims will
soon reach marrying age; 45.5% of the popul�ation is under 15."�
������ Given the extrem�ely�� high birth rate in
the generat��ion now growing up to beco�me the fathers and mothers of the next
two decades (much more numerous than the genera�tion presently in their
twenties and thir�ties and trying to stick to the three-children-per-family
norm), even a two-children-per-family norm would still amount to an impres�sive
demo�graphic growth for two more generatio�ns.�
With a norm of three children per family, Iran is not even pur�suing a
policy aimed at achie�ving demog�raphic zero growth, but even if it were, it
could only achi�eve it at a much later date, and at a much higher popula�tion
level, than countries with a more strin�gent com�mitment to demogra�phic respon�sibility.
������ There is no indication that even one
Muslim country will achieve a substa�ntially lower growth rate than India's Hindu
community within the next decades.�